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Leo Groarke has a record of launching innovative issues for argument scholars to ponder. For  example, 
he launched the visual argument initiative, and followed that with its expansion into a multi-modal 
argument initiative.  Not a few among us owe him our thanks for promotions we earned in part by 
engaging with issues he has introduced into the field of argument studies. Now, in “The end of argument” 
he proposes yet another: the prolong problem. Groarke asks us to treat his paper not as a solution to the 
prolong problem, but rather as its introduction into the field of argument studies and an invitation to join 
in seeking solutions. My comments are offered in the same spirit. 
 I think the first thing to do is to get clear about precisely what the prolong problem is supposed 
to be. As part of that job, I think we should be open to the possibility that there are more than one, in 
which case we might need to be dealing with the class of prolong problems, and possibly need to be 
seeking different solutions to different types of prolong problem. In the spirit of balanced  inquiry, we 
also ought to be open to the possibility that there really isn’t a problem. I will look at each example 
Groarke uses to introduce the problem and see if we can tease out a specification of a problem in each 
case, and if we can and it’s not the same problem in every case, see  if we can come up with a generic 
definition. Then I  will say a word about possible resources. 
 The UK and the EU. The status quo giving rise to the prolong problem that Lord Cledwyn 
identifies is that two policy-making parties share equal decision-making authority in the respect that they 
must agree on a proposed policy for it to be adopted; but there is no mechanism for resolving loggerhead 
disagreements. In the absence of some such mechanism, the arguing between the parties could be endless. 
Hence the status quo is insupportable. 
 Note first that the prolong problem arises in the situation in which there is no mechanism for 
resolving disagreements. The problem might have a simple solution, namely, create some mechanisms 
for dealing with disagreements. If that is possible, there really isn’t a problem. 
 Some arrangements look good in theory but don’t work in practice; others work in practice, when 
theoretically, they shouldn’t. Spouses often try to share the decision-making equally without having a 
mechanism for resolving disagreements (and sometimes they succeed). Why should they be subject to 
Lord Cledwyn’s worry? What actually happens at least to some couples is that they have the  good sense 
to realize that in their situation nothing but ongoing grief is to be gained by insisting on having the last 
word or by granting ultimate decision-making authority to just one of them. Various procedures for 
dealing with loggerhead confrontations are imaginable (e.g., they might cede final authority to one or the 
other in different spheres of interest,  they might take turns sharing veto power, and so on). Now, it might 
in the event be the case that when dealing with loggerhead disagreements in large bodies, such as 
legislative bodies, one cannot count on wisdom and good sense prevailing.  If that is true, then the UK 
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vs. the  EU is a real case of the prolong problem. It remains to be seen whether the drastic step the UK 
has taken to resolve it is a good idea. 
 Turning to the Saturday Shopping example, it turns out that I have already anticipated it in 
discussing the UK and the EU example. We can see from that discussion that Alf and Bev have various 
disagreement-resolving options available to them and the fact that they have different values and 
preferences need not cause  them to end them up in divorce court. But the kinds of procedures  and other 
kinds of devices that might be available to prevent the prolong problem from arising are likely to be 
different in the two instantiations of the problem situation. Recall my general description of the situation: 
  
The status quo is that two policy-making parties share equal decision-making authority in the 
respect that they must agree on a proposed policy for it to be adopted; but there is no mechanism 
for resolving loggerhead disagreements. 
 
What gives rise to a prolong problem is the lack of a mechanism for resolving  disagreements, not the 
fact that there are two parties whose interests and preferences might conflict. In arguing about what 
mechanism to employ to resolve disagreements, the parties could conceivably find themselves 
disagreeing and so needing a mechanism to employ to resolve disagreements.  Clearly a vicious infinite 
regress is in the offing. 
 The workplace issue is a version of the classic dysfunctional university department. There are 
two parties or groups involved, each of which accuses the other of objectionable behaviour. There can 
be—as in  the case Groarke describes—as few as one person constituting one party or group and as many 
as the whole department minus the accused (or aggrieved) party constituting the other party or group. A 
complication is that usually, as in the case described, there are front-line antagonists, and there are 
sympathizers not directly involved who lurk in the background. The antagonists also try to recruit 
supporters outside the groups directly involved. The prolong problem arises partly out of the nature of 
the grievance. In Groake’s example, the issue came to a head over accusations of harassment—an action 
with such vague parameters that it invites extended flurries of charges and countercharges. The 
ingredients of the situation typically include one or more of variety of grievances: personal antagonisms, 
feelings of being threatened (e.g., risks of losing perks or advantageous positions), anxiety about the 
future, doctrinal differences, contempt for the other party, conflicts of rights and duties, and no clear and 
decisive procedures perceived by all parties as fair that permit quick and final resolution of the issue. 
Almost certainly, the ostensible issue of the disagreement is not the real issue that feeds it. As a result, 
most of the arguings are at cross-purposes. 
 The workplace issue example strikes me as different from the UK and the EU and the Saturday 
Shopping examples. In the two earlier examples, there is a decision to be made and arguing is prolonged 
because there is no mechanism for resolving disagreements. In the Workplace Issue example, it is not a 
matter of deciding what to do. There is an accusation of misconduct and a  quasi-legal procedure with, 
it seems, ill-defined rules laying out the path to a finding or remedies. In institutions like universities the 
mechanisms available for dealing with personnel problems tend to be legalistic and not well suited to 
getting the underlying issues out in the open. As well, there is arguably an over-abundance of individual 
autonomy in the hands of people whose personalities and dispositions select them for academic 
excellence, not for collegiality, and for whom incontestable truth, not compromise, is their supreme ideal. 
Moreover, obtaining a resolution in such cases is more likely to require counselling, not arguing. If I am 
right, bodies like universities need to design conflict-resolution procedures that downplay arguing; and 
the model of legal dispute resolution, with its disputatious character and emphasis on arguing, should be 
avoided. 
 The Justice System is the fourth venue that Groarke suggests harbours the prolong problem. In 
the examples of legal arguing that he provides, he describes what might be called the legal arguing 
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paradox. It seems that any effort through legislation to reduce the amount of legal arguing only results 
in an increase in legal arguing. It’s like struggling in quicksand. The legal arguing paradox appears to be 
a logical consequence of the role of argument, at least in jurisdictions using the English legal system, but 
it in any case it seems historically to have been what happens.  
 This example of the prolong problem is different from the others that Groarke describes. It might 
better be called a proliferation problem, for it is not so much a matter of arguing about the same issue 
going on and on as it is a matter of one argument giving rise to several more, which  give rise to more, 
and so on.  It is a proliferation of arguing, spreading exponentially in the same fashion as a pandemic. It 
should be said that law is not  the only  institution having this property. The  academic world, or that 
branch of it called “the humanities”, equally seems to foster the proliferation of  arguing, and in its place 
that is not a bad thing.  
 Recall that Groarke’s aim was to illustrate what he is calling the “prolong hypothesis: 
 
– the thesis that there are many real life situations in which arguments which cannot settle the 
issues they address because they do not bring an end to arguing by resolving the issues they 
address, but instead prolong it, by perpetuating an indefinite (potentially endless) sequence of 
arguments and counter-arguments.  
 
Have we found this phenomenon in the examples he presents? Both the UK and the EU and the Saturday 
Shopping examples are instances in which an indefinite sequence of arguments and counterarguments is 
perpetuated only if there is a failure to create mechanisms for the parties to use to resolve loggerhead 
disagreements. The Workplace Issue example is an illustration of potentially endless arguments only if 
those tasked with trying to resolve them are unable to free the protagonists from the court-case solution 
model and deal with the issues that are fuelling the otherwise irreconcilable hostility that keeps the 
arguing going. The paradox of the cure contributing to the spread of  the disease found in the Pursuing 
Justice example does strike me as the most vexing instance of the prolong problem.  It cannot be solved 
by switching from arguing to therapy, or by designing dispute resolution mechanisms.  
 When he was defining  his terms at the outset of  the paper, Groarke said he will understand 
arguing as “the giving of reasons (premises) for believing something (a conclusion)”. I noticed that he 
didn’t include also “the giving of reasons for doing something, such as taking an action or endorsing a 
policy.” In fact, I believe that all his examples of the prolong problem assume arguing about what to do. 
That’s an easy slip to correct, but it reminds us of another possible resource to bring to bear on the 
prolong problem, namely deliberative rhetoric—arguing about doing, to use the title of Christian Kock’s 
recent book.  In my recent anthology, Studies in Critical Thinking (which no one seems to have looked 
at yet), Jan Albert van Laar has a fascinating class exercise he calls “Middle Ground”, that is  designed 
to provide students  with a device to use to settle a public controversy by means of a reasonable 
compromise. He references a considerable literature on compromise, negotiation, and collaborative 
decision making. Groarke also mentions Michael Gilbert’s ideal of coalescent arguing. Gilbert reminded 
us of how communication theory has emphasized the manifold nature of the goals people have in arguing 
(Gilbert 1997, 67), and he proposed a series of coalescent communicative procedures designed to 
optimize the achievement of our many goals. To solve the prolong problem in interpersonal arguing, the 
trick is to figure out how to change our deeply seated personal habits and social practices and replace 
winning the argument as our default objective with the objective of finding a workable compromise.  
 To sum up, what Groarke has introduced in his paper is not a prolong problem; it’s a whole hatful 
of them. Solving some seems to call for more-clever dispute-resolution mechanisms. Others call for 
limiting arguing to a restricted role and developing a counselling model for problem solving. Yet others 
seem intractable. In other words, they all call for much more research. And that was Groarke’s objective 
at the outset. 
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